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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Consumers of the prescription drug Coumadin, anxious 
to purchase its generic equivalent, ask us to determine if 
complaints filed by them sufficiently state a claim for 
injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act against 
Coumadin's manufacturer. We find that in dismissing the 
complaints under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the District Court 
improperly referred to matters beyond the complaints and 
did not correctly analyze the legal standard for antitrust 
standing. For these reasons, we will reverse and remand. 
 
I. 
 
Coumadin, known generically as warfarin sodium, is the 
brand name of a blood-thinning drug prescribed for the 
prevention and treatment of blood clots.1  Treating 
physicians carefully monitor patients taking the drug 
because, as the parties stipulated, too little a dose can lead 
to a stroke or cardiac arrest and too much can cause 
internal bleeding. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We accept as true the facts as alleged in the complaint. Bald Eagle 
School District v. Keystone Financial, Inc., 189 F.3d 321, 327 n.7 (3d 
Cir. 
1999). 
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The defendant, DuPont Pharmaceuticals Company, 
manufactures Coumadin. Although the patent protection 
for Coumadin expired in April 1962, DuPont has dominated 
the oral anti-coagulant market for over 30 years. Until one 
of the plaintiffs to this action, Barr Laboratories, Inc., 
introduced its generic tablets, no equivalent product 
competed with DuPont's Coumadin. 
 
Barr Laboratories and the present plaintiffs filed lawsuits 
alleging that DuPont, anticipating a loss of market share 
resulting from the introduction of a cheaper generic 
substitute for Coumadin, orchestrated a campaign 
disparaging generic substitutes generally, and Barr 
Laboratories' warfarin sodium particularly. The cumulative 
effect of these attacks was to raise Barr Laboratories' cost 
to enter the anti-coagulant market and to disable its 
market penetration. The by-product claim brought by the 
individual plaintiffs is that, due to DuPont's effort to derail 
generic competition, they have paid inflated prices for 
Coumadin. 
 
The specific allegations of DuPont's anti-competitive 
activity in the relevant market concern DuPont's attempt to 
prevent and/or delay Food and Drug Administration 
approval of warfarin sodium in a generic form, publication 
and dissemination of false and misleading information to 
the public regarding generic warfarin sodium, undertaking 
aggressive public relations efforts involving the circulation 
of deceptive information and increasing Coumadin's 
marketing efforts by feeding misinformation to doctors and 
other medical professionals. 
 
Citing these unlawful attempts to monopolize, Barr 
Laboratories filed suit against DuPont, alleging various 
antitrust law violations. Barr Laboratories also asserted 
claims under the Lanham Act, New York state law and 
common law. Four named individuals, each claiming to 
represent a nationwide class of 1.8 million Coumadin 
users, filed separate complaints for monetary damages and 
injunctive relief, alleging that DuPont violated section 2 of 
the Sherman Act and various state laws. These class 
plaintiffs also sought treble damages under section 4 of the 
Clayton Act and injunctive relief under section 16 of the 
Clayton Act. 
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DuPont filed a motion to dismiss both Barr Laboratories' 
and the class plaintiffs' claims for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6). 
 
The District Court granted in part and denied in part 
DuPont's motion to dismiss Barr Laboratories' lawsuit.2 The 
class complaints were dismissed in their entirety. 
 
The only issue relevant to this appeal is the District 
Court's decision that the class plaintiffs lack standing to 
seek injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act. 
The District Court summarily concluded that because the 
class had not sufficiently alleged either antitrust injury or 
a causal connection between DuPont's alleged unlawful 
activity and the supposed injury of Coumadin users, it 
failed to assert injury of the type the Sherman Act was 
designed to prevent. As such, the class did not have 
standing to request injunctive relief. 
 
Our jurisdiction to review this dismissal is authorized by 
28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. 
 
Rule 12(b)(6) 
 
We first explore whether the District Court erroneously 
considered matters beyond the scope of the complaints in 
rendering its antitrust standing determination. Our review 
of a District Court's decision to dismiss a lawsuit for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is plenary. Port Authority of New 
York and New Jersey v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305, 311 
(3d Cir. 1999). The motion to dismiss should be granted 
only if "after accepting as true all of the facts alleged in the 
complaint, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the 
plaintiff 's favor, no relief could be granted under any set of 
facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Barr Laboratories' case was subsequently remanded to the 
Southern District of New York. At oral argument, counsel represented 
that this portion of the litigation has settled. 
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Trump Hotels and Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts, 
Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
Although the District Court recited this Rule 12(b)(6) 
standard in making its decision, the court impermissibly 
cited and relied on facts beyond the corners of the 
complaints. Excerpts from the District Court opinion 
illustrate this point: 
 
       Although class plaintiffs do not discuss third party 
       payor arrangements, it is almost certain that most of 
       the 1.8 million class members had some sort of health 
       insurance. 
 
       * * * 
 
       If defendants' monopolization of the oral anticoagulant 
       market resulted in supracompetitive prices for 
       Coumadin, the insurance and third party payor 
       organizations most likely absorb some or all of that 
       overcharge. 
 
       * * * 
 
       Moreover, the sheer variety of third party payor plans 
       would render the apportionment of damages among the 
       class plaintiffs incredibly complex. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
While these factors loomed large in the District Court's 
conclusion regarding the absence of a significant nexus 
between DuPont's activity and the classes' injury, the 
complaints are notably silent regarding the impact of third 
party payor and prescription drug insurance plans on the 
price paid for Coumadin. The complaints instead alleged 
that the class members paid inflated prices for Coumadin 
because DuPont thwarted the generic's market entry. The 
District Court should have accepted this as true, analyzed 
if DuPont's preclusive conduct was violative of antitrust 
laws, and then decided whether to dismiss the complaints. 
Instead, in granting the motion, the District Court 
considered facts gleaned from counsel's argument and from 
its own experience, factors not contemplated by the dictates 
of Rule 12(b)(6). 
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DuPont submits a number of reasons why the District 
Court's consideration of factual assumptions de hors the 
complaints were properly considered. DuPont urges that 
the allegations concerning third party payors are within 
everyday knowledge and that the District Court could easily 
infer the presence of such entities from the pleadings. 
Alternatively, DuPont asserts that the District Court could 
take judicial notice of such facts. These contentions are not 
persuasive. First, Rule 12(b)(6) instructs that the District 
Court draw inferences in favor of plaintiffs, not the 
proponent of the motion. Second, the types of facts of 
which courts take judicial notice are of a different nature 
than those relied upon by the District Court here-- that 
the class members are most likely being reimbursed to 
some extent for the amount spent to purchase Coumadin. 
A judicially noticed fact is "one not subject to reasonable 
dispute in that it is either (1) generally known . .. . or (2) 
capable of accurate and ready determination" through 
unquestionably reliable sources. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); 
United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1202 n.3 (3d Cir. 
1994). The facts cited by the District Court concerning third 
party payors not contained in the complaints do notfit the 
criteria of Rule 201(b). 
 
Because these findings were integral to the District 
Court's standing decision, we must now determine whether 
the District Court's erroneous application of Rule 12(b)(6) 
caused a misinterpretation of the substantive standing 
issue. 
 
III. 
 
Section 16 Antitrust Standing 
 
Section 16 of the Clayton Act, authorizing suits for 
injunctive relief, provides in part: 
 
        Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be 
       entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any 
       court of the United States having jurisdiction over the 
       parties, against threatened loss or damage by a 
       violation of the antitrust laws, . . . when and under the 
       same conditions and principles as injunctive relief 
 
                                7 
  
       against threatened conduct that will cause loss or 
       damage is granted by courts of equity. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 26 (1976). 
 
Recovery under section 16 is best understood in how it 
differs from recovery under section 4 of the Clayton Act. 
While relief sought pursuant to section 4 of the Clayton Act 
requires proof of loss and any damages proven are trebled, 
injunctive relief under section 16 only requires a threat of 
loss. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 
104, 109-111 (1986). An antitrust plaintiff proceeding 
under section 16 must, however, still demonstrate that the 
injury in question is "injury of the type the antitrust laws 
were intended to prevent." Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl- 
O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). A section 4 plaintiff 's 
standing is tested by an application of a number of factors 
designed to determine if the asserted damage goes beyond 
speculation and, that if there is cognizable damage, the 
plaintiff is the appropriate person to assert it for antitrust 
purposes. Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. California 
State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983), 
("Associated General"). Section 16 is not as demanding, but 
it does require a showing that there is "a significant threat 
of injury from [a] . . . violation of the antitrust laws . . . ." 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 
100, 130 (1969). 
 
In dissecting the Coumadin classes' section 4 claim, the 
District Court conducted a standing test under thefive 
Associated General factors: (1) the causal connection 
between the antitrust violation and the harm to the 
plaintiff; (2) whether the plaintiff 's alleged injury is of the 
type that the antitrust laws were intended to redress; i.e., 
did the plaintiff suffer antitrust injuries; (3) the directness 
of the injury; (4) the existence of more direct victims of the 
violation; and (5) the potential for duplicative recovery or 
complex apportionment of damages. 459 U.S. at 535-46. 
 
Regarding factors one and three, which required the class 
to show that DuPont's monopolization of the anticoagulant 
market directly caused their injuries, the District Court 
identified the consumers' "third" position in the chain of 
distribution from DuPont to user and the influence of 
 
                                8 
  
managed care on what consumers pay for prescription 
drugs as reasons for holding that the class plaintiffs' 
alleged injury and DuPont's alleged conduct was too 
attenuated to justify antitrust standing. Specifically, the 
District Court opined that the class plaintiffs' ability to 
trace their overpayment to the alleged anticompetitive 
conduct " `traverses several somewhat vaguely defined 
links.' AGC, 456 U.S. at 540." The District Court thus 
concluded that the case described a "typical indirect 
purchaser scenario" and that, from the complaints, "it was 
unclear whether the class suffered any antitrust injury at 
all." 
 
As to the class plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief 
under section 16, the District Court summarily concluded, 
by relying upon its section 4 discussion, that the class had 
not sufficiently alleged the required antitrust injury or the 
causal connection between DuPont's alleged unlawful 
activity and their purported injury. Thus, the District Court 
decided that the class failed to allege injury of the type the 
Sherman Act was designed to prevent; the class, therefore, 
did not have standing to request injunctive relief. 
 
The Coumadin class fits the stereotypical indirect 
purchaser mold. Indirect purchaser status, however, is not 
fatal to a plaintiff 's request for injunctive relief under 
section 16 of the Clayton Act. 
 
In Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 
596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979), we explained how the 
difference between sections 4 and 16 claims influences the 
question of standing as it relates to indirect purchaser 
status: 
 
       in contrast to the treble damage action, a claim for 
       injunctive relief does not present the countervailing 
       considerations -- such as the risk of duplicative or 
       ruinous recoveries and the spectre of a trial burdened 
       with complex and conjectural economic analyses -- 
       that the Supreme Court emphasized when limiting the 
       availability of treble damages. 
 
Id. at 590. Accordingly, we held that the plaintiffs did not 
have to satisfy the direct purchaser requirement as a 
condition of seeking injunctive relief. Id. at 594. See also 
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Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 
205, 210 (3d Cir. 1980) (Section 16 relief more 
encompassing because language is less restrictive than 
section 4 and because injunctive remedy is flexible, 
adaptable tool for enforcing antitrust laws). 
 
While direct purchaser status is not mandated, the class 
must still make a showing of entitlement to injunctive relief 
requiring the demonstration of: (1) threatened loss or injury 
cognizable in equity; (2) proximately resulting from the 
alleged antitrust injury. See McCarthy v. Recordex Service, 
Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 856 (3d Cir. 1996). The narrow question 
before us then is whether the allegations of the class 
members' complaints, that DuPont's conduct precluded 
competition which caused Coumadin users to pay inflated 
prices for the drug, meet this standard. 
 
We turn first to guidance from the United States 
Supreme Court. The threatened injury to the class here 
resembles that of the plaintiff in Blue Shield of Virginia v. 
McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982). In McCready , the plaintiff 
complained of a conspiracy among psychiatrists and Blue 
Shield to shield psychiatrists from competition. McCready's 
visits to her psychologist were not covered by Blue Shield, 
although visits to psychiatrists were reimbursed. 
 
In deciding McCready, the Supreme Court addressed the 
relationship between the indirect purchaser doctrine and 
antitrust injury. The Court stated that whether a particular 
injury is too remote from the alleged violation to confer 
section 4 Clayton Act standing, depends upon the 
relationship of the injury alleged and the types of injury 
that Congress was targeting when it legislated particular 
anticompetitive conduct as unlawful. Id. at 476-78. The 
Court first determined that, in the absence of a risk of 
duplicative recovery, a plaintiff is not barred from bringing 
a claim under section 4 if he is a foreseeable victim of the 
antitrust violation. Id. at 475. Then the Court decreed that 
McCready's injury was "inextricably intertwined with the 
injury the conspirator sought to inflict," and had standing 
to pursue her section 4 claim. Id., 457 U.S. at 484. 
 
As in McCready, the class alleges injury by an unlawful 
restraint on competition in the market, and McCready is 
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thus instructive. First, McCready reinforces our holding in 
McCarthy that the Coumadin class cannot be barred from 
bringing suit simply based on its indirect purchaser status. 
McCready held that due to the absence of duplicative 
recovery, McCready and her class could maintain their suit 
for treble damages. Similarly, here, there is no risk of 
duplicative recovery because the class only seeks section 16 
injunctive relief. 
 
Next, concerning remoteness, the high price paid by 
consumers for Coumadin clearly resulted in " `the type of 
loss that the claimed violations . . . would be likely to 
cause,' " id. at 479, (quoting Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489). 
The class members here, like McCready, were "foreseeable 
and necessary victims" of DuPont's efforts to exclude the 
generic drug from the market. Indeed, if McCready, who 
voluntarily sought uncovered treatment from psychologists 
did not suffer from remoteness, then the purchasers of 
Coumadin, who have no choice in which warfarin sodium 
they purchased, were more predictable and more 
compelling victims of antitrust violations. 
 
Finally, McCready determined that an antitrust injury 
occurred because the higher cost for services paid by 
McCready was so "inextricably intertwined" with the true 
target of the conspiracy, the psychologists, that McCready 
also suffered antitrust injury. Utilizing this same rationale, 
we find that Coumadin consumers clearly suffer antitrust 
injury. Coumadin purchasers were the target of DuPont's 
antitrust violation. Regardless of the existence of the 
various links of middlemen, if there were no ultimate 
consumer of Coumadin, prices charged for the drug by 
DuPont to distributors, pharmacies, etc., would be 
irrelevant. The excess amount paid by Coumadin users not 
only is "inextricably intertwined" with the injury DuPont 
aimed to inflict, the overcharge was the aim of DuPont's 
preclusive conduct. It is difficult to imagine a more 
formidable demonstration of antitrust injury. 
 
The District Court's refusal to recognize standing to 
pursue this relief is also, as alluded to above, contrary to 
our jurisprudence. 
 
The authority of McCarthy v. Recordex, 80 F.3d at 845, 
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strongly supports a favorable standing determination. In 
McCarthy, the plaintiffs had complained that they paid 
inflated prices for photocopies of their medical records due 
to a conspiracy between hospitals and copy centers to 
inflate the cost of records. The plaintiffs were clients of the 
lawyers who were the direct purchasers of the fixed price 
copies. Despite the plaintiffs' status as indirect purchasers, 
we refused to view the multifaceted chain of distribution as 
too attenuated to support a finding of causation. 3 
 
Finally, decisions from our court which negated antitrust 
standing are distinguishable. In City of Pittsburgh v. West 
Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 1998), the city 
brought suit against two electric companies seeking 
damages and an injunction precluding the merger of the 
companies. The City claimed that the merger would void 
the possibility of lower-priced electric service charged to city 
residents. We held that the City's injunctive relief claim 
failed to meet section 16 standing requirements due to a 
lack of causal connection between the defendant's injuries 
and the alleged harm and because of the absence of 
antitrust injury. We arrived at this conclusion, however, 
because an intervening regulatory scheme precluded the 
companies from competing, i.e., the merger was not the 
cause of the injury. No significant antitrust injury inquiry 
was required to reach this conclusion and none was 
undertaken. We can reasonably posit, however, that if not 
for this regulatory quirk, the City would have been entitled 
to section 16 relief because the proposed merger would 
have eradicated competition, a result prohibited under the 
Clayton Act, and detrimental to the City's electrical 
customers. 
 
In Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip 
Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1999), union health and 
welfare funds brought class actions against tobacco 
companies under antitrust laws to recover for the funds' 
cost of treating fund participants who had smoking related 
diseases. We concluded that the funds' injuries were too 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In McCarthy, we acknowledged the appropriateness of injunctive relief, 
but remanded because the District Court had not expressly addressed 
the question of indirect purchaser standing. 
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remote from the tobacco company's antitrust activity to 
satisfy the Associated General causal connection 
requirement, because the tobacco companies could have 
achieved their alleged aim to preclude marketing of safer 
tobacco products without the existence of the funds or the 
relationship between the funds and the smokers. The 
existence of smokers would be sufficient reason for such an 
alleged conspiracy. 
 
In this case, the purchasers of Coumadin are akin to the 
smokers in Steamfitters. DuPont's efforts to keep the 
generic drug off the market emanate from the fact that the 
introduction of the generic product would force down the 
price paid for the anti-coagulant. The higher prices paid 
were the raison d'etre of DuPont's antitrust conduct. 
 
We, therefore, conclude, under the controlling 
jurisprudence, that this class has satisfied the 
requirements of standing for injunctive relief under section 
16 of the Clayton Act. The facts as alleged in the 
complaints plainly establish the required causal connection 
between DuPont's exclusionary anticompetitive conduct and 
the direct harm to Coumadin purchasers. Unless enjoined, 
DuPont's unlawful conduct will continue unchecked and 
the class will continue to bear the financial brunt of the 
antitrust violations. 
 
IV. 
 
We will reverse the order of the District Court dismissing 
the class complaints based on lack of antitrust standing 
and remand for continued proceedings. 
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